Inﬂuence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election by Bovet, Alexandre & Makse, Hernán A.
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research City College of New York 
2019 
Influence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016 US presidential 
election 
Alexandre Bovet 
CUNY City College 
Hernán A. Makse 
CUNY City College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cc_pubs/716 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
ARTICLE
Influence of fake news in Twitter during the 2016
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The dynamics and influence of fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election
remains to be clarified. Here, we use a dataset of 171 million tweets in the five months
preceding the election day to identify 30 million tweets, from 2.2 million users, which contain
a link to news outlets. Based on a classification of news outlets curated by www.opensources.
co, we find that 25% of these tweets spread either fake or extremely biased news. We
characterize the networks of information flow to find the most influential spreaders of fake
and traditional news and use causal modeling to uncover how fake news influenced the
presidential election. We find that, while top influencers spreading traditional center and left
leaning news largely influence the activity of Clinton supporters, this causality is reversed for
the fake news: the activity of Trump supporters influences the dynamics of the top fake news
spreaders.
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Recent social and political events, such as the 2016 USpresidential election1, have been marked by a growingnumber of so-called “fake news”, i.e. fabricated information
that disseminate deceptive content, or grossly distort actual news
reports, shared on social media platforms. While misinformation
and propaganda have existed since ancient times2, their impor-
tance and influence in the age of social media is still not clear.
Indeed, massive digital misinformation has been designated as a
major technological and geopolitical risk by the 2013 report of the
World Economic Forum3. A substantial number of studies have
recently investigated the phenomena of misinformation in online
social networks such as Facebook4–10, Twitter10–13, YouTube14,
or Wikipedia15. These investigations, as well as theoretical
modeling16,17, suggest that confirmation bias18 and social influ-
ence results in the emergence, in online social networks, of user
communities that share similar beliefs about specific topics, i.e.
echo chambers, where unsubstantiated claims or true informa-
tion, aligned with these beliefs, are as likely to propagate
virally6,19. A comprehensive investigation of the spread of true
and false news in Twitter also showed that false news is char-
acterized by a faster and broader diffusion than true news mainly
due to the attraction of the novelty of false news12. A polarization
in communities is also observed in the consumption of news in
general20,21 and corresponds with political alignment22. Recent
works also revealed the role of bots, i.e. automated accounts, in
the spread of misinformation12,23–25. In particular, Shao et al.
found that, during the 2016 US presidential election on Twitter,
bots were responsible for the early promotion of misinformation,
that they targeted influential users through replies and men-
tions26 and that the sharing of fact-checking articles nearly dis-
appears in the core of the network, while social bots proliferate13.
These results have raised the question of whether such mis-
information campaigns could alter public opinion and endanger
the integrity of the presidential election24. Here, we use a
dataset of 171 million tweets sent by 11 million users covering
almost the whole activity of users regarding the two main US
presidential candidates, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump,
collected during the five months preceding election day and used
to extract and analyze Twitter opinion trend in our previous
work27. We compare the spread of news coming from websites
that have been described as displaying fake news with the spread
of news coming from traditional, fact-based, news outlets with
different political orientations. We relied upon the opinion of
communications scholars (see Methods for details) who have
classified websites as containing fake news or extremely biased
news. We investigate the diffusion in Twitter of each type of
media to understand what is their relative importance, who are
the top news spreaders, and how they drive the dynamics of
Twitter opinion. We find that, among the 30.7 million tweets
containing an URL directing to a news outlet website, 10% point
toward websites containing fake news or conspiracy theory and
15% point toward websites with extremely biased news. When
considering only tweets originating from non-official Twitter
clients, we see a tweeting rate for users tweeting links to websites
containing news classified as fake more than four times larger
than for traditional media, suggesting a larger role of bots in the
diffusion of fake news. We separate traditional news outlets from
the least biased to the most biased and reconstruct the informa-
tion flow networks by following retweets tree for each type of
media. User diffusing fake news form more connected networks
with less heterogeneous connectivity than users in traditional
center and left leaning news diffusion networks. While top news
spreaders of traditional news outlets are journalists and public
figures with verified Twitter accounts, we find that a large number
of top fake and extremely biased news spreaders are unknown
users or users with deleted Twitter accounts. The presence of two
clusters of media sources and their relation with the supporters of
each candidate is revealed by the analysis of the correlation of
their activity. Finally, we explore the dynamics between the top
news spreaders and the supporters’ activity with a multivariate
causal network reconstruction28. We find two different
mechanisms for the dynamics of fake news and traditional news.
The top spreaders of center and left leaning news outlets, who are
mainly journalists, are the main drivers of Twitter’s activity and
in particular of Clinton supporters’ activity, who represent the
majority in Twitter27. For fake news, we find that it is the activity
of Trump supporters that governs their dynamics and top
spreaders of fake news are merely following it.
Results
News spreading in Twitter. To characterize the spreading of
news in Twitter we analyze all the tweets in our dataset that
contained at least one URL (Uniform Resource Locator, i.e. web
address) linking to a website outside of Twitter. We first separate
URL in two main categories based on the websites they link to:
websites containing misinformation and traditional, fact-based,
news outlets. We use the term traditional in the sense that news
outlets in this category follow the traditional rules of fact-based
journalism and therefore also include recently created news
outlets (e.g. vox.com).
Classifying news outlets as spreading misinformation or real
information is a matter of individual judgment and opinion, and
subject to imprecision and controversy. We include a finer
classification of news outlets spreading misinformation in two
sub-categories: fake news and extremely biased news. Fake news
websites are websites that have been flagged as consistently
spreading fabricated news or conspiracy theories by several fact-
checking groups. Extremely biased websites include more
controversial websites that not necessarily publish fabricated
information but distort facts and may rely on propaganda,
decontextualized information, or opinions distorted as facts. We
base our classification of misinformation websites on a curated
list of websites which, in the judgment of a media and
communication research team headed by a researcher of
Merrimack College, USA, are either fake, false, conspiratorial,
or misleading (see Methods). They classify websites by analyzing
several aspects, such as if they try to imitate existing reliable
websites, if they were flagged by fact-checking groups (e.g. snopes.
com, hoax-slayer.com, and factcheck.org), or by analyzing the
sources cited in articles (the full explanation of their methods is
available at www.opensources.co). We discard insignificant
outlets accumulating less than 1% of the total number of tweets
in their category. We classify the remaining websites in the
extremely biased category according to their political orientation
by manually checking the bias report of each websites on www.
allsides.com and mediabiasfactcheck.com. Details about our
classification of websites spreading misinformation is available
in the Methods section.
We also use a finer classification for traditional news websites
based on their political orientation. We identify the most
important traditional news outlets by manually inspecting the
list of top 250 URL’s hostnames, representing 79% of all URLs,
shared on Twitter. We classify news outlets as right, right leaning,
center, left leaning, or left based on their reported bias on www.
allsides.com and mediabiasfactcheck.com. The news outlets in the
right leaning, center, and left leaning categories are more likely to
follow the traditional rules of fact-based journalism. As we move
toward more biased categories, websites are more likely to have
mixed factual reporting. As for misinformation websites, we
discard insignificant outlets by keeping only websites that
accumulate more than 1% of the total number of tweets of their
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2
2 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |            (2019) 10:7 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
respective category. Although we do not know how many news
websites are contained in the list of less popular URLs, a
threshold as small as 1% allows us to capture a relatively broad
sample of the media in term of popularity. Assuming that the
decay in popularity of the websites in each media category is
similar, our measure of the proportion of tweets and users in each
category should not be significantly changed if we extended our
measure to the entire dataset of tweets with URLs. While the
detail of our classification is subject to some subjectivity, we find
that our analysis reveals patterns encompassing several media
categories that form a group with similar characteristics. Our
results are therefore robust to changes of classification within
these larger group of media.
We report the hostnames in each categories along with the
number of tweets with a URL pointing toward them in
Supplementary Table 1. Using this final separation in seven
classes, we identify in our dataset (we give the top hostname as an
example in parenthesis): 16 hostnames corresponding to fake
news websites (e.g. thegatewaypundit.com), 17 hostnames for
extremely biased (right) news websites (e.g. breitbart.com), 7
hostnames for extremely biased (left) news websites (e.g.
dailynewsbin.com), 18 hostnames for left news websites (e.g.
huffingtonpost.com), 19 hostnames for left leaning news websites
(e.g. nytimes.com), 13 hostnames for center news websites (e.g.
cnn.com), 7 hostnames for right leaning websites (e.g. wsj.com),
and 20 hostnames for right websites (e.g. foxnews.com).
We identified 30.7 million tweets with an URL directing to a
news outlet website, sent by 2.3 million users. An important point
when comparing the absolute number of tweets and users
contributing to the spread of different types of news is the bias
introduced by the keywords selected during the data collection.
Indeed, if we had used keywords targeting specific news outlets or
hashtags concerning specific news event, it would be impossible
to perfectly control the bias toward fake and reliable news or
the representation of the political orientation of the tweet sample.
Here, we used neutral keywords in term of media representation,
the names of the two main candidates to the presidential election
(see Methods), in order to collect a sample representative of the
real coverage of the election on Twitter by all media sources.
We see a large number of tweets linking to fake news websites
and extremely biased news websites (Fig. 1a and Table 1).
However, the majority of tweets linking to news outlets points
toward left leaning news websites closely followed by center news
websites. Tweets directing to left and left leaning news websites
represent together 38% of the total and tweets directing towards
center news outlets represents 21%. Tweets directing to fake and
extremely biased news websites represents a share of 25%. When
considering the number of distinct users having sent the tweets
instead of the number of tweets (Fig. 1b and Table 1), the share of
left and left leaning websites increases to 43% and the share of
center news to 29%, while the share going to fake news and
extremely biased news is equal to 12% (the share of users differ
slightly from Table 1 when grouping categories as users may
belong to several categories). The number of tweets linking to
websites producing fake and extremely biased news is comparable
with the number for center, left and left leaning media outlets.
However, users posting links to fake news or extreme bias (right)
websites are, in average, more active than users posting links to
other news websites (Table 1). In particular, they post around
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Fig. 1 Importance of different types of news outlets in Twitter. Number of
distinct tweets (a) and number of distinct users having sent tweets (b) with
a URL pointing to a website belonging to one of following categories: fake or
extremely biased, right, right leaning, center, left and left leaning news
outlets. While the tweet volume of fake and extremely biased news is
comparable to the tweet volumes of center and left volume (a), users
posting fake and extremely biased news are around twice more active in
average (see Table 1). Consequently, the share of users posting fake and
extremely biased news (b) is smaller (12%) than the share of tweets
directing toward fake and extremely biased news websites (25%)
Table 1 Tweet and user volume corresponding to each media category in Twitter
Nt pt Nu pu Nt/Nu pt,n/o pu,n/o Nt,n/o/Nu,n/o
Fake news 2,991,073 0.10 204,899 0.05 14.60 0.19 0.03 80.35
Extreme bias (right) 3,969,639 0.13 294,175 0.07 13.49 0.09 0.03 36.52
Right news 4,032,284 0.13 416,510 0.10 9.68 0.11 0.04 24.80
Right leaning news 1,006,746 0.03 272,347 0.06 3.70 0.18 0.06 11.39
Center news 6,322,257 0.21 1,032,722 0.24 6.12 0.20 0.05 26.68
Left leaning news 7,491,344 0.24 1,272,672 0.30 5.89 0.14 0.04 18.64
Left news 4,353,999 0.14 674,744 0.16 6.45 0.14 0.05 16.64
Extreme bias (left) 609,503 0.02 99,743 0.02 6.11 0.06 0.03 11.46
Number, Nt, and proportion, pt, of tweets with a URL pointing to a website belonging to one of the media categories. Number, Nu, and proportion, pu, of users having sent the corresponding tweets, and
average number of tweets per user, Nt/Nu, for each category. Proportion of tweets sent by non-official clients, pt,n/o, proportion of users having sent at least one tweet from an non-official client, pu,n/o,
and average number of tweets per user sent from non-official clients, Nt,n/o/Nu,n/o
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Fig. 2 Retweet networks formed by the top 100 news spreaders of different media categories. Retweet networks for fake news (a), extreme bias (right)
news (b), right news (c), center news (d), left leaning news (e), and left news (f) showing only the top 100 news spreaders ranked according to their
collective influence. The direction of the links represents the flow of information between users. The size of the nodes is proportional to their Collective
Influence score, CIout, and the shade of the nodes’ color represents their out-degree, i.e. the number of different users that have retweeted at least one of
her/his tweets with a URL directing to a news outlet, from dark (high out-degree) to light (low out-degree). The network of fake (a) and extreme bias
(right) (b) are characterized by a connectivity that is larger in average and less heterogeneous than for networks of center and left leaning news (Table 2)
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twice the number of tweets compared to users posting links
towards center or left leaning news outlets.
The proportion of tweets sent by, and users using, non-official
Twitter clients (Table 1) allows to evaluate the importance of
automated posting in each category. Details about our classifica-
tion of official Twitter clients are available in the Methods. We see
that the two top categories are fake news and center news with
around 20% of tweets being sent from non-official accounts.
When considering the proportion of users sending tweets from
non-official clients, the number is very similar for all categories,
around 4%, showing that the automation of posting plays an
important role across all media categories. Indeed, non-official
clients includes a broad range of clients, from “social bots” to
applications used to facilitate the management of professional
Twitter accounts. A large discrepancy between sources arises
when we consider the average number of tweets per users sent
from non-official clients (Table 1). Users using non-official clients
to send tweets with links directing to websites displaying fake
news tweeted an average of 80 times during the collection period,
which is more than twice the value for other types of news outlets.
This high activity from non-official clients suggests an abnormal
presence of bots. The role of bots in the diffusion of fake news has
already been documented13,26 as well as their presence in the
Twitter discussions during 2016 US election24.
We note that Breitbart News is the most dominant media
outlet in term of number of tweets among the right end of the
outlet categories with 1.8 million tweets (see Supplementary
Table 1). We examine the relation between Breitbart and the rest
of the media outlets in Supplementary Note 1, Supplementary
Tables 2–6 as well as Supplementary Fig. 1. Our analysis shows
that removing Breitbart from the extreme bias category does not
change our results significantly.
Networks of information flow. To investigate the flow of
information we build the retweet networks for each category of
news websites, i.e. when a user u retweets (a retweet allows a user
to rebroadcast the tweet of an other user to his followers) the
tweet of a user v that contains a URL linking to a website
belonging to one of the news media category, we add a link, or
edge, going from node v to node u in the network. The direction
of the links represents the direction of the information flow
between Twitter users. We do not consider multiple links with the
same direction between the same two users and neither consider
self-links, i.e. when a user retweet her/his own tweet. The out-
degree of a node is its number of outgoing links and is equal to
the number of different users that have retweeted at least one of
her/his tweets. Its in-degree is its number of in-going links and
represents the number of different users she/he retweeted.
Figure 2 shows the networks formed by the top 100 news
spreaders of the six most important retweet networks. The
retweet networks for right leaning and extreme bias (left) news is
shown in Supplementary Fig. 2. We explain in the section Top
news spreaders and in the Methods how the news spreaders are
identified. A clear difference is apparent between the networks
representing the flow of fake and extremely biased (right) news
and the networks for left leaning and center news (Table 2 and
Supplementary Fig. 3). The left leaning and center news outlets
correspond to larger networks in term of number of nodes and
edges, revealing their larger reach and influence in Twitter.
However, the retweet networks corresponding to fake and
extremely biased (right) news outlets are the most dense with
an average degree 〈k〉≃ 6.5. The retweet network for right news
has characteristics in between those two groups with a slightly
larger size than the networks for fake and extremely biased (right)
news and a larger average degree than center news. These results
show that users spreading fake and extremely biased news,
although in smaller numbers, are not only more active in average
(Table 1), but also connected (through retweets) to more users in
average than users in the traditional news networks. Table 2 also
shows that the center and left leaning networks have the most
heterogeneous out-degree distribution and the fake news retweet
networks has the less heterogeneous out-degree distribution. We
measure the heterogeneity of the distribution with a boot-
strapping procedure (see Table 2) to ensure the independence of
the measure on the networks’ sizes. Our analysis indicates that the
larger networks (center, left leaning) differ from the smaller ones
not just by their size but also by their structure. The heterogeneity
of the degree distribution plays an important role in spreading
processes on networks, indicating a strong hierarchical diffusion
cascade from hubs to intermediate degree, and finally to small
degree classes29,30. The characteristics of the weighted retweet
networks, taking into account multiple interactions between
users, reveal the same patterns than the unweighted networks
(Supplementary Table 7). Table 2 and Supplementary Fig. 3a
reveals the existence of users with very large out-degree (kout >
5 × 105), in the center and left leaning networks, i.e. very
important broadcasters of information, which are not present
in other networks. This suggests that different mechanisms of
information diffusion could be at play in the center and left
leaning news networks, where high degree nodes may play a more
important role, than in the fake and extremely biased news
networks.
We note that a difference between the largest networks, i.e
center and left leaning news, and the fake and extremely biased
networks is that the former have typically access to more
broadcasting technologies, which may be disruptive to under-
standing diffusion patterns based on network data31. The
Table 2 Retweet networks characteristics for each news source categories
N nodes N edges 〈k〉 σ (kout)/〈k〉 σ (kin)/〈k〉 max (kout) max (kin)
Fake news 175,605 1,143,083 6.51 32 ± 4 2.49 ± 0.06 42,468 1232
Extreme bias (right) 249,659 1,637,927 6.56 36 ± 6 2.73 ± 0.03 51,845 588
Right 345,644 1,797,023 5.20 44 ± 11 2.70 ± 0.04 86,454 490
Right leaning 216,026 495,307 2.29 45 ± 11 1.72 ± 0.02 32,653 129
Center 864,733 2,501,037 2.89 75 ± 39 2.69 ± 0.06 229,751 512
Left leaning 1,043,436 3,570,653 3.42 59 ± 19 3.38 ± 0.10 145,047 843
Left 536,903 1,801,658 3.36 47 ± 12 3.50 ± 0.08 58,901 733
Extreme bias (left) 78,911 277,483 3.52 33 ± 6 2.49 ± 0.08 23,168 648
We show the number of nodes and edges (links) of the networks, the average degree, 〈k〉= 〈kin〉= 〈kout〉 (the in-/out-degree of a node is the number of in-going/out-going links attached to it). In a
directed network, the average in-degree and out-degree are always equal. The out-degree of a node, i.e. a user, is equal to the number of different users that have retweeted at least one of her/his tweets.
Its in-degree represents the number of different users she/he retweeted. The ratio of the standard deviation and the average of the in- and out-degree distribution, σ(kin)/〈k〉 and σ(kout)/〈k〉, measures
the heterogeneity of the connectivity of each networks. As the standard deviation of heavy-tailed degree distributions can depend on the network size, we computed the values of σ(kin)/〈k〉 and σ(kout)/
〈k〉 by taking the average, and standard error, of 1000 independent samples, of 78,911 values each, drawn from the in- and out-degree distributions of each network
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structural differences we observe may be explained by the fact
that there is something different about the way that the people in
these networks organize and share information but it may also be
the case that there are subgroups of users in the center and left
leaning news networks that form diffusion networks with a
similar structure as the smaller fake and extremely biased news
networks and then also have a large number of other individuals
added to these subgroups due to the presence of important
broadcast networks that feed their ideology or information needs.
While inspecting specific accounts is not the goal of this study,
looking at the two accounts with the maximum kout and kin
reveals an interesting contrast between users of both networks.
The user with the largest out-degree of the center news network is
the verified account of the Cable News Network, CNN, (@CNN),
Table 3 Top 25 CI news spreaders of the retweet networks corresponding to each media category
Rank Fake news (7 verified, 2
deleted, 16 unverified)
Extreme bias (right) news (15
verified, 1 deleted, 9 unverified)
Right news (23 verified, 0
deleted, 2 unverified)
Right leaning news (20 verified,
1 deleted 4 unverified)
1 @PrisonPlanet✓ @realDonaldTrump✓ @FoxNews✓ @WSJ✓
2 @RealAlexJones✓ @DailyCaller✓ @realDonaldTrump✓ @WashTimes✓
3 @zerohedge @BreitbartNews✓ @dcexaminer✓ @RT_com✓
4 @DRUDGE_REPORT @wikileaks✓ @DRUDGE_REPORT @realDonaldTrump✓
5 @realDonaldTrump✓ @DRUDGE_REPORT @nypost✓ @RT_America✓
6 @mitchellvii✓ @seanhannity✓ @FoxNewsInsider✓ @WSJPolitics✓
7 deleted @WayneDupreeShow✓ @DailyMail✓ @DRUDGE_REPORT
8 @TruthFeedNews @LindaSuhler @AllenWest✓ @KellyannePolls✓
9 @RickRWells @mitchellvii✓ @RealJamesWoods✓ @TeamTrump✓
10 deleted @LouDobbs✓ @foxandfriends✓ @LouDobbs✓
11 @gatewaypundit✓ @PrisonPlanet✓ @foxnation✓ @rebeccaballhaus✓
12 @infowars @DonaldJTrumpJr✓ @LouDobbs✓ @WSJopinion✓
13 @Lagartija_Nix @gerfingerpoken @KellyannePolls✓ @reidepstein✓
14 @DonaldJTrumpJr✓ @FreeBeacon✓ @JudicialWatch✓ deleted
15 @ThePatriot143 @gerfingerpoken2 @PrisonPlanet✓ @JasonMillerinDC✓
16 @V_of_Europe @TeamTrump✓ @wikileaks✓ @DanScavino✓
17 @KitDaniels1776 @Italians4Trump @TeamTrump✓ @PaulManafort✓
18 @Italians4Trump @benshapiro✓ @IngrahamAngle✓ @SopanDeb✓
19 @_Makada_ @KellyannePolls✓ @marklevinshow✓ @asamjulian
20 @BigStick2013 @DanScavino✓ @LifeZette✓ @JudicialWatch✓
21 @conserv_tribune✓ deleted @theblaze✓ @_Makada_
22 @Miami4Trump @JohnFromCranber @FoxBusiness✓ @mtracey✓
23 @MONAKatOILS @true_pundit @foxnewspolitics✓ @Italians4Trump
24 @JayS2629 @ThePatriot143 @BIZPACReview @Telegraph✓
25 @ARnews1936 @RealJack @DonaldJTrumpJr✓ @RealClearNews✓
Rank Center news (24 verified, 0
deleted, 1 unverified)
Left leaning news (25 verified, 0
deleted 0 unverified)
Left news (25 verified, 0
deleted, 0 unverified)
Extreme bias (left) news (7 verified,
1 deleted, 17 unverified)
1 @CNN✓ @nytimes✓ @HuffPost✓ @Bipartisanism✓
2 @thehill✓ @washingtonpost✓ @TIME✓ @PalmerReport✓
3 @politico✓ @ABC✓ @thedailybeast✓ @peterdaou✓
4 @CNNPolitics✓ @NBCNews✓ @RawStory✓ @crooksandliars✓
5 @Reuters✓ @Slate✓ @HuffPostPol✓ @BoldBlueWave
6 @NateSilver538✓ @PolitiFact✓ @NewYorker✓ @Shareblue✓
7 @AP✓ @CBSNews✓ @MotherJones✓ @Karoli
8 @business✓ @voxdotcom✓ @TPM✓ @RealMuckmaker
9 @USATODAY✓ @ABCPolitics✓ @Salon✓ @GinsburgJobs
10 @AP_Politics✓ @ezraklein✓ @thinkprogress✓ @AdamsFlaFan
11 @FiveThirtyEight✓ @nytpolitics✓ @mmfa✓ @mcspocky
12 @bpolitics✓ @guardian✓ @joshtpm✓ @Shakestweetz✓
13 @jaketapper✓ @NYDailyNews✓ @MSNBC✓ deleted
14 @DRUDGE_REPORT @latimes✓ @NYMag✓ @JSavoly
15 @cnnbrk✓ @BuzzFeedNews✓ @samstein✓ @OccupyDemocrats
16 @businessinsider✓ @Mediaite✓ @JuddLegum✓ @ZaibatsuNews
17 @AC360✓ @HillaryClinton✓ @mashable✓ @wvjoe911
18 @cnni✓ @nytopinion✓ @theintercept✓ @DebraMessing✓
19 @brianstelter✓ @CillizzaCNN✓ @DavidCornDC✓ @SayNoToGOP
20 @KellyannePolls✓ @MSNBC✓ @dailykos✓ @coton_luver
21 @wikileaks✓ @KFILE✓ @JoyAnnReid✓ @EJLandwehr
22 @SopanDeb✓ @TheAtlantic✓ @nxthompson✓ @mch7576
23 @KFILE✓ @SopanDeb✓ @thenation✓ @RVAwonk
24 @BBCWorld✓ @Fahrenthold✓ @justinjm1✓ @_Carja
25 @NewDay✓ @BuzzFeed✓ @ariannahuff✓ @Brasilmagic
Verified users have a checkmark (✓) next to their user name. Verifying its accounts is a feature offered by Twitter that “lets people know that an account of public interest is authentic” (help.twitter.com/
en/managing-your-account/about-twitter-verified-accounts). Unverified accounts do not have a checkmark and accounts marked as deleted have been deleted either by Twitter or by the users
themselves
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which regularly posts links towards its own website using mainly
the non-official professional client Sprinklr (www.sprinklr.com).
The user with the largest in-degree of the fake news network is
the user @Patriotic_Folks, which, at the moment of this writing,
seems to belong to a deceiving user, whose profile description
contains the hashtag #MAGA and refer to a website belonging to
our fake news website list (thetruthdivision.com). The name of
the account is “Annabelle Trump” and its profile picture is a
young woman wearing cow-boy clothes (a reverse image search
on the web reveals that this profile image is not authentic as it
comes in fact from the catalog of a website selling western
clothes). Most of its tweet are sent from the official Twitter Web
Client, suggesting that a real person is managing the account, and
contains URLs directing to the same fake news website. However,
having a high in-degree does not indicate that this user has an
important influence. Indeed, its out-degree is approximately 3.5
times smaller than its in-degree and, as we explain in the next
section, influence is poorly measured by local network properties
such as in- or out-degree.
Top news spreaders. In order to uncover the most influential
users of each retweet network, we use the Collective Influence
(CI) algorithm32 which is based on the solution of the optimal
network percolation. For a Twitter user to be highly ranked by the
CI algorithm, she/he does not necessarily need to be directly
retweeted by many users, but she/he needs to be surrounded by
highly retweeted users (see Methods for more details).
We find that top news spreaders of left leaning and center news
are almost uniquely verified accounts belonging to news outlets or
journalists (Table 3). A very different situation for news spreaders
of the fake news and extremely biased news websites is revealed,
where, among verified accounts of news websites and journalists,
we also find a large number of unknown, unverified, users that are
not public figures but are important news spreaders in Twitter
(Fig. 3 and Table 3). We also find deleted accounts, which could
have been deleted either by Twitter for infringing their rules and
policies or by the users themselves, mostly in the fake and
extremely biased news spreaders. We find that, based on the
timestamp of their last tweet in our dataset, 24 out of the 28
accounts had tweeted after election day (8 November 2016),
indicating that they were deleted after the election. Deleted
accounts were extremely active, with a median number of tweets
of 2224 (minimum: 156, 1st quartile: 1400, 3rd quartile: 6711, and
maximum: 15,930). In comparison, the median number of tweets
per users for our entire dataset is 2. We also find that 21 deleted
accounts used an unofficial Twitter client (the most used one by
deleted accounts is dlvr.it). The list of the right, right leaning, and
left news top spreaders form a mix of verified and unverified
accounts. Figure 2 shows the retweet networks formed by the top
100 spreaders of each category and Fig. 4 shows the combined
retweet network formed by top 30 news spreaders of all media
categories and reveals the separation of the top news spreaders in
two main clusters as well as the relative importance of the top
spreaders. The sets of top 100 fake news, extremely biased (right),
right, and right leaning news spreaders have an important
overlap, >30 (Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table 8). Fake and
extremely biased news is mostly spread by unverified accounts
which could be due to the fact that some accounts are trying to
hide their real identity but also to the fact that audiences of the
fake and extremely biased news are more likely to listen to “non-
public” figures due to their distrust of the establishment.
We distinguish three types of unverified accounts: (1)
unverified accounts that are not necessarily misleading or
deceiving, for example, @zerohedge, @DRUDGE_REPORT or
@TruthFeedNews make their affiliation to their respective news
websites clear, although their identities or the ones of their
websites administrators is not always clear; (2) unverified
accounts that make their motif clear in their choice of screen-
name, e.g. @Italians4Trump or @Miami4Trump, although the
real identity of the persons behind such accounts is also usually
undisclosed; (3) finally, unverified accounts that seem to be real
persons with profile pictures and user names, e.g @Lagartija_Nix,
@ThePatriot143, @BigStick2013, @LindaSuhler, @gerfingerpo-
ken, or @AdamsFlaFan, but are not public figures. Whether such
users are authentic, social bots or fake users operated by someone
else is not clear. However, our results show that such users are not
present in the top news spreaders of the center and left leaning
news, while they have a high prevalence in the fake and extremely
biased categories.
Another observation is the presence of members of the
campaign staffs of each candidate in the top news spreaders
(see Supplementary Note 2 and Supplementary Table 9). We see
more users linked to the campaign staff of Donald Trump (13),
and with higher ranks in term of influence, than to the campaign
staff of Hillary Clinton (3), revealing the more important direct
role of the Trump team in the diffusion of news in Twitter.
News spreading dynamics. To investigate the news spreading
dynamics of the different media categories on Twitter, we analyze
the correlations between the time series of tweeting rate measured
for each category. The Twitter activity time series are constructed
by counting the number of tweets with a URL directing toward a
website belonging to each of the media category at a 15 min
resolution. In addition to the activity related to each media group,
we also consider the time series of the activity of the supporters of
each presidential candidates. We classify supporters based on the
content of their tweets using a supervised machine learning
algorithm trained on a dataset obtained from the network of
hashtag co-occurrences. The full detail of our method and the
validation of its opinion trend with the national polling average of
the New York Times is described in ref. 27. We use our full dataset
of tweets concerning the two candidates, namely 171 million
tweets sent by 11 million distinct users during more than five
months. After removing automated tweets (see Methods), we
have a total of 157 million tweets. This represents an average of
1.1 million tweets per day (standard deviation of 0.6 million) sent
by an average of about 375,000 distinct users per day (standard
deviation of 190,000). A majority of users, 64%, is in favor of
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NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |            (2019) 10:7 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-07761-2 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications 7
Hillary Clinton while 28% is in favor of Donald Trump (8% are
unclassified as they have the same number of tweets in each
camp). However, we find that Trump supporters are, in average,
1.5 times more active than Clinton supporters27. The supporters
therefore represent the general Twitter population commenting
on the candidate of the election.
We removed the trend and circadian cycles present in the time
series with the widely used STL (seasonal-trend decomposition
procedure based on Loess) method33, which is a robust iterative
filtering method allowing to separate a time series in seasonal (in
this case, daily), trend, and remainder components (see Methods).
The separation of the media sources in two correlated clusters
is revealed when using a threshold of r0= 0.49, corresponding to
the place of the largest gap between the sorted correlation values
(Fig. 5). The value of each cross-correlation coefficient is reported
in Supplementary Table 10. The first activity cluster (indicated by
a red square in Fig. 5a) comprises the fake, extreme bias (right),
and right news. The second activity cluster (indicated by a blue
square) is made of the center, left, and left leaning news sources.
The activities of right leaning and extremely biased (left) news are
only poorly correlated with the other news categories or
supporters (see Supplementary Table 10). We observe the
following patterns between the media groups and the supporters
dynamics: the activity of Clinton supporters has a higher
correlation with the second cluster than with the first one while
the activity of Trump supporters is equally correlated with the
two clusters. This indicate that Trump supporters are likely to
react to any type of news while Clinton supporters mostly react to
center and news on the left and tend to ignore news coming from
the right side.
These results indicate that the media included in the two
clusters respond to two different news dynamics and show that
the polarization of news observed at the structural level in
previous works20–22 also corresponds to a separation in
dynamics. This separation could be showing that Americans
with different political loyalties prefer different news sources but
could also be due to the fact that supporters prefer the news that
their candidate prefers34.
In order to investigate the causal relations between news media
sources and Twitter dynamics, we use a multivariate causal
network reconstruction of the links between the activity of top
news spreaders and supporters of the presidential candidates
based on a causal discovery algorithm28,35,36. The causal network
reconstruction tests the independence of each pair of time series,
for several time lags, conditioned on potential causal parents with
a non-parametric conditional independence test37,38 (see Meth-
ods). We use the causal algorithm as a variable selection and
perform a regression of a linear model using only the true causal
link discovered. We consider linear causal effects for their reliable
estimation and interpretability. This permits us to compare the
causal effect as first order approximations, estimate the
uncertainties of the model, and reconstruct a causal directed
weighted networks28. In this framework, the causal effect between
a time series Xi and Xj at a time delay τ, ICEi!jðτÞ, is equal to the
expected value of Xjt (in unit of standard deviation) if X
i
tτ is
perturbed by one standard deviation28.
An assumption of causal discovery is causal sufficiency, i.e. the
fact that every common cause of any two or more variables is in
the system35. Here, causal sufficiency is not satisfied since
Twitter’s activity is only the observed part of a larger social
system and the term “causal” must be understood to be meant
relative to the system under study. As for the cross-correlation
analysis, we use the residuals of the STL filtering of the 15 tweet
volume time series (Fig. 6a, b).
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We consider only the activity of the top 100 news spreaders
since, by definition of CI, they are the most important sources of
information. Therefore, within the limitation of considering
Twitter as a closed system, they are the most likely set of users to
trigger the activity of the rest of the population. We test this
hypothesis with Granger causal modeling.
Our causal analysis takes into account self-links, i.e. the auto-
correlation of each time series, and reveals that they are the
strongest causal effect for all time series. Since we are interested in
the cross-links, we leave the self-links aside for the rest of the
discussion. The center and left leaning news spreaders have the
strongest causation on the supporters activity, with a stronger
effect on the Clinton supporters than on the Trump supporters
(Table 4 and Fig. 6c). Since the Clinton supporters dominate
Twitter activity, they also are the main drivers of the global
activity. The other top news spreaders have only a small or
negligible effect on the supporters activity. In particular, extreme
bias (left), left, right leaning, and right news spreaders are more
influenced by the activity of Clinton and Trump supporters than
the opposite. We also observe that Trump supporters have a
significant causal effect on the fake news spreaders’ activity and
Clinton supporters have a significant effect on extreme bias (left)
spreaders’ activity (Fig. 6c). This suggests that they are in fact
following Twitter activity rather than driving it. Regarding the
causal relations in-between news spreaders, center news spreaders
are the most central driver as they are among the top three drivers
of all news spreaders except for fake news (Table 4). Strong
mutual causal effects are revealed between center and left leaning
spreaders. Right leaning top spreaders are driving the activity of
the right, extremely biased (right) and fake news spreaders. The
two supporter groups have also strong mutual causal effects.
These results reveal two very different dynamics of news
diffusion for traditional, center and left leaning, news and
misinformation. Center and left leaning news spreaders are the
most influential and are driving the supporters activity. On the
other hand, the dynamics of fake news spreaders seems to be
governed by the ensemble of Trump supporters.
The interpretation of the discovered causal effects must be
understood within the limitation that we do not measure the
diffusion of news outside of Twitter. Indeed, the reason why
center and left leaning news spreaders have a causal effect on the
Clinton supporters could be explained by the fact that they are
the first to be “activated” by some news appearing, for example on
television, while the supporters take more time to be “activated”
by the same news. However, we have other indications that the
news spreaders are directly causing at least part of the supporters’
activity, namely that the top news spreaders are precisely the most
important source of news retweets. Moreover, if the external
driver is an other media outside of Twitter and that the center/left
leaning news spreaders, who are almost all journalists, are the first
to be activated, it is very likely that the media channel outside of
Twitter is related to the journalists. In this case, even if the
causation is indirect, we still identify the correct driver through
the affiliation of the journalists. More importantly, while we
observe a strong causal effect between center/left leaning news
spreaders and the supporters, we do not observe a significant
causal effect between other news spreaders and the supporters.
This indicates that, even if the causal driver could be outside of
Twitter, the diffusion mechanisms of traditional and fake news
are very likely different.
We investigate the influence of the presence of staff members
of the candidates’ teams in Supplementary Note 2, Supplementary
Fig. 4 and Supplementary Table 11. We observe no significant
changes in the causal relations after having removed all users
linked to the campaigns. We also repeated our analysis after
having removed news aggregators from our dataset (see
Supplementary Note 3, Supplementary Fig. 5, Supplementary
Tables 12 and 13) and found that news aggregators are not
responsible for the observed differences in dynamics.
Discussion
Using a dataset of tweets collected during the 5 months preceding
the 2016 presidential elections, we investigated the spread of
content classified as fake news and compared its importance and
influence with traditional, fact-based, media. We find that fake
Pro-Clinton
a
b
Left leaning
Center
Extreme bias
(right)
Right
Fake news
News websites
Right
Fake news
Pro-Trump
Left leaning
Pro-Clinton
Left
Center
Extreme bias (right)
Supporters
Fa
ke
 
n
ew
s
Pr
o-
Cl
in
to
n
Le
ft
Le
ft 
le
an
in
g
Ce
nt
er
Pr
o-
Tr
u
m
p
Ri
gh
t
Ex
tre
m
e 
bi
as
(rig
ht
)
Pro-Trump
Left
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
Fig. 5 Activity correlation between news outlets and supporters. a Pearson
cross-correlation coefficients between activity time series related to the
different types of news outlets, Trump supporters and Clinton supporters.
b Graph showing the correlation relations between the types of news
websites and the supporters. The edges of the graph represent correlations
larger than r0= 0.49. Fake news, extreme bias (right), and right websites
form a first cluster, indicated by a red square in a and shown in orange in b,
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Clinton supporters, which represents the largest activity, is mainly
correlated with the second media cluster and only poorly with the first one
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news represents 10% and extremely biased news 15% of the
tweets linking to a news outlet media. However, taking into
account the difference in user activity decreases the share of fake
and extremely biased news to 12%. Although we find approxi-
mately the same ratio of users using automated Twitter clients in
each media category, we find that automated accounts diffusing
fake news are much more active than the automated accounts
diffusing other types of news. This results confirms the role of
bots in the diffusion of fake news, which has been shown using a
different method of bot detection26, and shows that automated
accounts also play a role, although smaller, in the diffusion of
traditional news.
We analyzed the structure of the information diffusion net-
work of each category of news and found that fake and extremely
biased (right) news diffusion networks are more densely con-
nected, i.e. users retweet more people and are more retweeted in
average, and have less heterogeneous connectivity distributions
than traditional, center, and left leaning, news diffusion networks.
The heterogeneity of the degree distribution is known to play an
important role in spreading processes on networks29,30. Spread-
ing in networks with heterogeneous connectivity usually follows a
hierarchical dynamics in which the information propagates from
higher-degree to lower-degree classes30.
We discovered the top news spreaders of each type of news by
computing their Collective Influence32 and found very different
profiles of fake and extremely biased news top spreaders com-
pared to traditional news spreaders. While traditional news
spreaders are mostly journalists with verified Twitter accounts,
fake and extremely biased news top spreaders include unverified
accounts with seemingly deceiving profiles and deleted accounts.
Analyzing the Twitter activity dynamics of the news diffusion
corresponding to each media category, we reveal the existence of
two main clusters of media in term of activity correlation which is
consistent with the findings of previous works4–9 that revealed
the separation in polarized communities of online social media
news consumers. We also show that right news media outlets are
clustered together with fake news. Finally, a causality analysis
between the top news spreaders activity and the activity of pre-
sidential candidate supporters revealed that the top news sprea-
ders of center and left leaning news outlets are the ones driving
Twitter activity while top news spreaders of fake news are in fact
following Twitter activity, particularly Trump supporters activity.
Our analysis focuses on news concerning the candidate of the
presidential election published from the most popular news
outlets and therefore its results cannot be directly generalized to
the entire Twitter population. Nevertheless, our investigation
provides new insights into the dynamics of news diffusion in
Twitter. Namely, our results suggests that fake and extremely
biased news are governed by a different diffusion mechanisms
than traditional center and left leaning news. Center and left
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leaning news diffusion is driven by a small number of influential
users, mainly journalists, and follow a diffusion cascade in a
network with heterogeneous degree distribution which is typical
of diffusion in social networks30, while the diffusion of fake and
extremely biased news seems to not be controlled by a small set of
influencers but rather to take place in more connected clusters
and to be the result of a collective behavior.
Methods
Twitter data collection and processing. We collected tweets continuously using
the Twitter Search API from 1 June 2016 to 8 November 2016. We gather a total of
171 million tweets in the English language, mentioning the two top candidates
from the Republican Party (Donald J. Trump) and Democratic Party (Hillary
Clinton) by using two different queries with the following keywords: hillary OR
clinton OR hillaryclinton and trump OR realdonaldtrump OR donaldtrump.
We extracted the URLs from tweets by using the expanded_url field attached to
each tweet containing at least one URL. A large number of URL were redirecting
links using URL shortening services (e.g. bit.ly, dlvr.it, or ift.tt). News websites
sometimes also uses shortened versions of their hostnames (e.g. cnn.it, nyti.ms, hill.
cm, or politi.co). We programmatically resolved shortened URLs, using the Python
Requests library, in order to find their final destination URL and extracted the
hostname of each final URL in our dataset.
To identify tweets that may originate from bots, we extract the name of the
Twitter client used to post each tweet from their source field and kept only tweets
originating from an official twitter client. Third-party clients represents a variety of
applications, form applications mainly used by professional for automating some
tasks (e.g. sprinklr.com or dlvrit.com) to manually programmed bots, and are used
to post ≤8% of the total number of tweets. When a programmatic access to Twitter
is gained through its API to send tweets, the value of the source field of automated
tweets corresponds to the name, which must be unique, given to the “App” during
the creation of access tokens. Supplementary Table 14 shows the clients we
consider as official and the corresponding number of tweets with URLs originating
from each client. The number of tweets with a URL originating from official clients
represents 82% of the total number of tweets with a URL. This simple method
allows to identify tweets that have not been automated and scales very easily to
large datasets contrary to more sophisticated methods39. Indeed, Botometer is not
well suited for historical data as it requires several tweets per users (up to 200) and
results of a Twitter search of tweets (up to 100) mentioning each users, which we
cannot do retroactively. We compared our method with the results of Botometer
(see Methods section of ref. 27) and found that our method has a good accuracy but
suffer from a relatively high number of false positive compared to Botometer.
Advanced bots might not be detected by our method, but this is also a problem for
more advanced methods that relies on a training set of known bots39. We remove
all tweets sent from non-official clients when computing the activity of supporters
but we keep them when building the retweet networks, as we want to include
automated accounts that play a role in the diffusion of news.
News outlets classification. Among the 55 million tweets with URLs linking
outside of Twitter, we identified tweets directing to websites containing fake news
by matching the URLs’ hostname with a curated list of websites, which, in the
judgment of a media and communication research team headed by Melissa Zim-
dars of Merrimack College, USA, are either fake, false, conspiratorial, or mis-
leading. The list, freely available at www.opensources.co, classifies websites in
several categories, such as “Fake News”, “Satire”, or “Junk Science”. For our study,
we construct two non-overlapping set of websites: fake news websites and extre-
mely biased websites. The set of fake news website is constructed by joining the
hostnames listed under the categories “Fake News” and “Conspiracy Theory” by
www.opensources.co. The following definitions of these two categories are given at
www.opensources.co
● “Fake News”: sources that entirely fabricate information, disseminate
deceptive content, or grossly distort actual news reports,
● “Conspiracy Theory”: sources that are well-known promoters of kooky
conspiracy theories.
The set of extremely biased websites contains hostnames appearing in the
category “Extreme Bias” (defined as sources that come from a particular point of
view and may rely on propaganda, decontextualized information, and opinions
distorted as facts by www.opensources.co) but not in any of the categories used to
construct the set of fake news. Hostnames in each categories along with the number
of tweets with a URL pointing toward them are reported in Supplementary Table 1.
We discard insignificant outlets accumulating less than 1% of the total number of
tweets in their category.
Websites classified in the extremely biased (right) category, respectively
extremely biased (left) category, have a ranking between right bias and extreme
right bias, respectively left and extreme left, on mediabiasfactcheck.com. The bias
ranking on www.allsides.com of these same websites is right, respectively left
(corresponding to the most biased categories of www.allsides.com). The website
mediabiasfactcheck.com also reports a level of factual reporting for each websites
and we find that all the websites classified in the extremely bias category have a
level of factual reporting which is mixed or worse. We also find that all the websites
remaining in the fake news category have a bias between right and extreme right on
mediabiasfactcheck.com. The website www.allsides.com rates media bias using a
combination of several methods such as blind surveys, community feedback, and
independent research (see www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-rating-
methods for a detailed explanation of the media bias rating methodology used by
AllSides), and mediabiasfactcheck.com scores media bias by evaluating wording,
sourcing, and story choices as well as political endorsement (see
Table 4 Causal effects between the top spreaders and the candidates supporters
↙ Pro-Clinton Pro-Trump Fake news Extreme bias (right) Right
Pro-Clinton 0.65 ± 0.01 0.14 ± 0.01 0.029 ± 0.007 0.021 ± 0.006 0.002 ± 0.006
Pro-Trump 0.11 ± 0.02 0.46 ± 0.01 0.009 ± 0.006 0.003 ± 0.001 0.0014 ± 0.0009
Fake news 0.015 ± 0.003 0.10 ± 0.01 0.14 ± 0.01 0.05 ± 0.01 0.03 ± 0.01
Extreme bias
(right)
0.02 ± 0.01 0.009 ± 0.002 0.03 ± 0.01 0.21 ± 0.01 0.04 ± 0.01
Right 0.009 ± 0.002 0.025 ± 0.008 0.03 ± 0.01 0.02 ± 0.01 0.18 ± 0.01
Right leaning 0.018 ± 0.008 0.038 ± 0.008 0.02 ± 0.01 0.01 ± 0.01 0.07 ± 0.01
Center 0.04 ± 0.01 0.023 ± 0.010 0.021 ± 0.007 0.0020 ± 0.0007 0.009 ± 0.008
Left leaning 0.04 ± 0.01 0.015 ± 0.006 0.003 ± 0.001 0.0010 ± 0.0005 0.009 ± 0.007
Left 0.03 ± 0.01 0.03 ± 0.01 0.010 ± 0.008 0.002 ± 0.001 0.01 ± 0.01
Extreme bias (left) 0.08 ± 0.01 0.03 ± 0.02 0.031 ± 0.009 0.03 ± 0.01 0.0025 ± 0.0008
↙ Right leaning Center Left leaning Left Extreme bias (left)
Pro-Clinton 0.003 ± 0.001 0.065 ± 0.008 0.062 ± 0.008 0.017 ± 0.009 0.006 ± 0.006
Pro-Trump 0.0020 ± 0.0009 0.038 ± 0.006 0.033 ± 0.008 0.020 ± 0.007 0.015 ± 0.006
Fake news 0.06 ± 0.01 0.037 ± 0.009 0.016 ± 0.002 0.014 ± 0.008 0.022 ± 0.009
Extreme bias (right) 0.06 ± 0.01 0.039 ± 0.009 0.018 ± 0.002 0.026 ± 0.009 0.027 ± 0.009
Right 0.09 ± 0.01 0.044 ± 0.009 0.016 ± 0.002 0.0026 ± 0.0009 0.033 ± 0.008
Right leaning 0.22 ± 0.01 0.042 ± 0.009 0.033 ± 0.009 0.0014 ± 0.0008 0.0027 ± 0.0008
Center 0.012 ± 0.010 0.266 ± 0.009 0.18 ± 0.01 0.019 ± 0.010 0.013 ± 0.008
Left leaning 0.005 ± 0.003 0.18 ± 0.01 0.299 ± 0.009 0.012 ± 0.008 0.003 ± 0.002
Left 0.015 ± 0.008 0.08 ± 0.01 0.10 ± 0.01 0.164 ± 0.010 0.07 ± 0.01
Extreme bias (left) 0.005 ± 0.009 0.034 ± 0.009 0.045 ± 0.009 0.03 ± 0.01 0.27 ± 0.01
We show the value of the maximal causal effect ICE;maxi!j ¼ max0<ττmax ICEi!jðτÞ

 between each pair (i, j) of activity time series, where τmax= 18 × 15 min= 4.5 h is the maximal time lag considered, with
standard errors (s.d., see Methods). The arrows indicate the direction of the causal effect. For each activity time series, we indicate in bold the three most important drivers of activity (excluding
themselves)
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mediabiasfactcheck.com/methodology for an explanation of Media Bias Fact Check
methodology).
A potential issue with the methodology of OpenSources is the blurring of the
assessment of “bias,” which has to do with news content, with the assessment of
“establishment”, which has to do with news form. Specifically, their steps 4–6
indicate they count thinks like use of the Associated Press style guide and the
production quality of the website. These criteria thus conflate adherence to
establishment norms—which are likely to be correlated with things like budgets for
professional design, fact-checking, editorial oversight etc.—with lack of bias. That
is, if two media sites present the same news, but one does it in a less established
format, it may be considered “extremely biased.” For this reason, we manually
reassessed the bias of each website in the extreme bias categories on
mediabiasfactcheck.com and allsides.com to validate their bias, as these two
websites do not list the rejection of the establishment as a criteria for their bias
assessment. However, even if we do not use the criteria of adherence or rejection of
the establishment in our classification, websites in the extreme bias (right) and
extreme bias (left) categories are more likely to not adhere with the establishment
as this variable seems to be highly correlated with political bias.
In order to validate our classification, we compare it to the domain-level
ideological alignment scores of news outlets obtained by Bakshy et al.22 which is
based on the average self declared ideological alignment of Facebook users sharing
URLs directing to news outlets. We find a R2= 0.9 for the linear regression
between the ideological alignment found by Bakshy et al. and our classification
where we mapped our categories between −3 and 3 (see Supplementary
Fig. 6). Supplementary Data file SuppData_top_urls_per_category.csv contains the
top 10 URLs of each media category along with notes about their classification on
fact-checking websites (when available), links to the fact-checking websites, and
additional information. We observe that the classification of the most popular
URLs is well aligned with the label assigned to their domains.
We investigate the influence and importance of news at the domain level and
not at the article level. Since a website classified as fake may contain factual articles
and vice versa, domain-level classification implies a level of imprecision. However,
it allows us to reveal the integrated effect of news outlets over more than 5 months
and to measure the relative importance of each type of news by classifying all URLs
directing to important news outlets. Moreover, classifying domains instead of URL
(or article) allows to consider the extended effect of each type of news. Indeed,
when a Twitter user follows a URL to a news article containing factual information
on a website publishing mostly fake news, she/he will be exposed to the other
articles containing fake news on the websites. Therefore, this particular fact-based
news ultimately increases the potential influence of fake news.
Collective influence algorithm in directed networks. We use the CI algorithm32
applied to directed networks to find the most influential nodes of the information
retweet networks. The CI algorithm is based on the solution of the optimal per-
colation of random networks which consists of identifying the minimal set of
nodes, the super-spreaders, whose removal would dismember the network in many
disconnected and non-extensive components. The fragmentation of the network is
measured by the size of the largest connected component, called the giant com-
ponent of the network. The CI algorithm considers influence as an emergent
collective property, not as a local property such as the node’s degree, and has been
shown to be able to identify super-spreaders of information in social networks40,41.
Here, we consider a directed version of the algorithm where we target the super-
sources of information.
The procedure is as follows40: we first compute the value of CI‘;outðiÞ for all
nodes i= 1, …, N as
CI‘;outðiÞ ¼ koutðiÞ  1ð Þ
X
j 2 ∂Boutði; ‘Þ
koutðjÞ>0
koutðjÞ  1ð Þ;
ð1Þ
where ‘ is the radius of the ball around each node we consider, here we use ‘ ¼ 2,
kout(i) is the out-degree of node i, and ∂Boutði; ‘Þ is the set of nodes situated at a
distance ‘ from node i computed by following outgoing paths from i. The node
with the largest CI‘;out value is then removed from the network and the value of
CI‘;out of nodes whose value is changed by this removal is recomputed. This
procedure is repeated until the size of the weakly connected largest component
becomes negligible. The order of removal of the nodes corresponds to the final
ranking of the network top news spreaders shown in Table 3.
A comparison of the ranking obtained by the CI algorithm with rankings
obtained by considering out-degree (high degree centrality) and Katz centrality42
(Supplementary Fig. 7) shows that high degree (HD) and Katz rankings of the top
100 CI spreaders fall mostly within the top 100 ranks of these two other measures
with only a small number of top CI spreaders having a poor HD or Katz ranking.
Note that the CI algorithm is especially good at identifying influential nodes that
are locally weakly connected but are influent on a larger scale32.
Time series processing. We find that a 15 min resolution offers a sufficiently
detailed sampling of Twitter activity. Indeed, a representative time scale of Twitter
activity is given by the characteristic retweet delay time, i.e. the typical time
between an original tweet and its retweet. We find that the median time of the
retweet delay distribution in our dataset is 1 h 57 min and the distribution has a
log-normal shape (first quartile at 20 min and third quartile at 9 h 11 min). We
tested the consistency of our results using a resolution of 5 min and 1 h and did not
see significant changes.
In order to perform the cross-correlation and causality analysis of the activity
time series, we processed the time series to remove the trend and circadian activity
cycles and to deal with missing data points. For each missing data points, we
remove the entire day corresponding to the missing observation in order to keep
the period of the circadian activity consistent over the entire time series. This is
necessary to apply filtering technique to remove the periodic component of the
time series. When removing an entire day, we consider that the day starts and ends
at 4 a.m., corresponding to the time of the day with lowest Twitter activity. We
removed a total of 24 days, representing 15% of our observation period. We then
applied an STL (seasonal-trend decomposition procedure based on Loess)33
procedure to extract the trend, seasonal and remainder components of each activity
time series. We only consider the remainder components for the cross-correlation
and causality analysis. We set the seasonal period of the STL filter equal to the
number of observations per day, np= 96, and the seasonal smoothing period to
ns= 95, such that the seasonal component is smooth and the remainder component
retains the higher frequency signal containing the activity of interest. Varying the
value of the smoothing period to ns= 47 does not change significantly the results.
Causal analysis. The STL procedure removes the trend and circadian pattern in
the time series, resulting in stationary time series (the stationarity of each time
series is confirmed by an augmented Dickey–Fuller test43). Before performing the
causal analysis, we also standardized each time series in order to remove any
influence of the difference in absolute values of time series. The causal analysis is
performed using the entire time period (more than 5 months) and therefore reveals
causal effects that are observed “in average” over the entire time period.
In order to infer the causal relations between the activity of the top news
spreaders and the supporters, we use a multivariate causal discovery algorithm
based on the PC algorithm35 and further adapted for multivariate time series by
Runge et al.28,36,44. Considering an ensemble of stochastic processes X the
algorithm proceeds as follows. First, for every time series Y∈X the sets of
preliminary parents is constructed by testing their independence at a range of time
lags: PYt ¼ Xtτ j0<τ  τmax;Yt?= Xtτf g. As this set also contains indirect links,
they are then removed by testing if the dependence between Yt and each Xτ 2 PYt
vanishes when it is conditioned on an incrementally increased set of conditions
Pn;iYt  PYt , where n is the cardinality of P
n;i
Yt
and i is the index iterating over the
number of combinations of picking n conditions from PYt . The combinations of
parents having the strongest dependence in the previous step are selected first28,44.
The main free parameters are the maximum time lag τmax and the significance
level of the independence test used during the first step to build the set of
preliminary parents which we set to αPC= 0.1. We set the value of the maximum
time lag to τmax= 18 time steps (i.e. 270 min) as it is the lag after which the lagged
cross-correlations between each time series falls below 0.1 in absolute value (see
Supplementary Figs. 8–11). We set the maximum number of tested combinations
of the conditioning set to 3 and we do not limit the size of the conditioning set.
We test the conditional independence of time series with the non-parametric
RCoT test38. This test uses random Fourier features to approximate the kernel-
based conditional independence test KCIT37 and is at least as accurate as KCIT
while having a run time that scales linearly with sample size38. This point is crucial
for our case given the size of our dataset (13,152 time points × 10 time series × 18
time lags). We set the number of Fourier features to nf= 400.
We select the significant final causal links by applying a Benjamini–Hochberg
False Discovery Rate (FDR) correction45 to the p-values of the conditional
independence tests with a threshold level of 0.05. FDR corrections allow to control
the expected proportion of false positive. The final causal links, i.e. parents of each
time series, are reported in Supplementary Table 15.
Following the procedure of refs. 28,46, We then regress a linear model:
Xt ¼
Xτmax
τ¼1
ΦðτÞXtτ þ εt ; ð2Þ
where all time series are standardized and only coefficients corresponding to true
causal links are estimated while all the other ones are kept equal to zero, i.e.
Φij(τ) ≠ 0 only for Xitτ ! Xjt . The causal effect between a time series Xi and Xj at a
time delay τ can be computed from the regressed coefficients as
ICEi!jðτÞ ¼ ΨijðτÞ; ð3Þ
where Ψ(τ) is computed from the relation ΨðτÞ ¼Pτs¼1 ΦðsÞΨðτ  sÞ, with
Φ(0)= I. Here, Ψij(τ) gives the sum over the products of path coefficients along all
causal paths up to a time lag τ. The causal effect ICEi!jðτÞ represents the expected
value of Xjt (in unit of standard deviation) if X
i
tτ is perturbed by one standard
deviation28.
To reconstruct the causal network, we are interested in the aggregated effects
and therefore use the lag with maximum effect:
ICE;maxi!j ¼ max0<ττmax I
CE
i!jðτÞ

: ð4Þ
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We estimate the standard errors of each causal effects with a residual-based
bootstrap procedure (similarly to ref. 28). We employ 200 bootstrap surrogates time
series generated by running model (2) with a joint random sample εt (with
replacement) of the original multivariate residual time series εt and compute the
standard deviation of the ICE;maxi!j values.
Code availability. The analysis and plotting scripts allowing to reproduce the results
of this paper are available at https://github.com/alexbovet/information_diffusion. The
Python module used for the network analysis (graph-tool) is available at https://
graph-tool.skewed.de. The causal discovery algorithm software (TIGRAMITE) is
available at https://jakobrunge.github.io/tigramite. The code for the conditional
independence test (RCIT and RCoT software) is available at https://github.com/
ericstrobl/RCIT. The code for the LOESS processing is available at https://github.com/
jcrotinger/pyloess.
Data availability
The raw Twitter data cannot be directly shared as it would infringe the Twitter
Developer Terms. However, we are sharing the tweet IDs of the data we collected
which allows anyone to download the tweets used for this study directly from
Twitter using Twitter's API. The datasets analyzed in this study are available under
the limits of Twitter’s Developer Terms at http://kcore-analytics.com. The classi-
fication of news as “fake” news or “extremely biased” news is a matter of opinion,
rather than a statement of fact. This opinion originated in publically available
datasets from fact-checking organizations (i.e. www.opensources.co). The conclu-
sions contained in this article should not be interpreted as representing those of the
authors.
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